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Abstract
This paper presents a descriptive analysis of the primary and secondary market for
Finnish treasury bonds. The paper focuses on three issues. First, we report basic
descriptive statistics such as auction volumes and secondary market yields and
volumes. Second, we estimate the revenues earned by primary dealers from the
treasury bond market. Third, we analyse the development of the price of the
auctioned bonds, relative to other benchmark bonds, around the time of the
auction. We find evidence of a price decrease in the auctioned bond series before
the auction and a price increase after the auction. This pattern is strongest for
1992–1994 when Treasury funding needs were heavy and secondary market
trading volume of treasury bonds was modest.
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Tutkimuksessa kuvaillaan Suomen valtion sarjaobligaatioiden ensi- ja jälkimark-
kinoita. Tutkimuksessa raportoidaan kolmenlaisia asioita. Ensiksi esitetään kuvai-
levia tilastoja esimerkiksi huutokauppojen määristä ja volyymeistä sekä niiden
jälkimarkkinatuotoista ja -volyymeistä. Toiseksi estimoidaan päämarkkinatakaa-
jien sarjaobligaatioiden kaupalla ansaitsemia tuloja. Kolmanneksi analysoidaan
huutokaupattavien obligaatioiden hintakehitystä muihin viitelainoihin nähden
huutokauppaa ympäröivinä päivinä. Tutkimuksessa havaitaan, että huutokaupatta-
van lainan hinta laskee ennen huutokauppaa ja nousee sen jälkeen. Ilmiö on
vahvin vuosina 1992–1994, jolloin Valtiokonttorin rahoitustarve oli hyvin suuri ja
obligaatioiden jälkimarkkinavaihto melko vähäistä.
Asiasanat: sarjaobligaatioiden huutokaupat, jälkimarkkinat










This paper presents a descriptive analysis of the primary and secondary market for
Finnish Treasury bonds. Despite of its size – the amount of euro denominated
Treasury bonds outstanding at the end of 2000 was EUR 42 billion – there has to
date been surprisingly little empirical analysis of the Finnish Treasury bond
market. A notable exception is the study of Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist
(2002), which focuses on the strategic behavior of primary dealers in Treasury
bond auctions. This paper attempts to fill the gap in the literature by addressing
the following issues.
First, we provide some basic descriptive statistics of the primary market. In
the 1990s the vast funding needs of the Finnish government made the Treasury a
frequent issuer of bonds, and there are about 300 bond auctions of various types in
our data. The large number of auctions allows us to measure the link between the
primary market and the secondary market data with unusual precision.
Second, we report some key descriptive statistics from the secondary market.
We are armed with a rich dataset which includes the volumes and yields from
actual transactions between primary dealers and their customers. This allows us to
accurately estimate the effective trading margins and the sales pressure associated
with auctions. Effective trading margins are a key ingredient in one of the most
interesting features of our work, the analysis of the secondary market trading
revenues earned by the primary dealers. Complemented with an analysis of sales
commissions and redemption fees generated from the primary market, trading
revenues give insight into primary dealers’ entry and exit from the primary dealer
system.
Third, we link the primary market and secondary market together and analyze
the development of the price of the auctioned bonds, relative to other benchmark
bonds, around the time of the auction. We find evidence of a price decrease in the
auctioned bond series before the auction and an increase in its price after the
auction. We also document that the magnitude of the price change is inversely
related to the magnitude of primary dealers’ net sales of bonds to their customers.
A number of studies investigate Treasury auctions in other countries.
Cammack (1991), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), and Malvey and Archibald
(1998) study U.S. Treasury auctions. Umlauf (1993), Hamao and Jegadeesh
(1998), and Scalia (1998) study Mexican, Japanese, and Italian auctions,
respectively. Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002) examine bidder behavior
in Swedish Treasury auctions. Bjønnes (2001a, 2001b) does the same for
Norwegian auctions. Hansch and Saporta (1999) study the revenues of
government bond market makers in the U.K.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the institutional environment that prevailed in Finland during our sample period.8
Section 3 describes the data. Our empirical results are reported in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional environment
The year 1990 marked the end of a long period of strong economic growth in
Finland. At the end of 1990 the nominal value of Finnish government debt was
approximately EUR 9 billion.
1 In 1991 the Finnish economy plunged into a severe
and lengthy depression and the government accumulated EUR 5.1 billion of new,
mostly foreign, debt. Figure 1 illustrates the development of Finnish government
debt between January 1991 and November 1999. The debt is divided into two
components, markka/euro denominated and foreign currency denominated debt.
Particularly in 1992, and to a lesser extent in 1993, currency debt dominated. In
1992 currency debt increased by EUR 10.5 billion and markka debt by EUR 3.1
billion. In 1993 the corresponding numbers were EUR 8.3 billion and EUR 6.9
billion. This suggests that the State Treasury found it difficult to raise financing
from domestic sources at attractive terms. In 1994 the increase in markka debt
(EUR 5.2 billion) already exceeded the increase in currency debt (EUR 3.5
billion). Since 1995 the government financed its fiscal deficit by issuing domestic
debt.
Saukkonen (1995) documents that in 1991–1995 U.S. dollar denominated
bonds issued by the Finnish Treasury yielded on average 48 basis points more
than corresponding bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury. For the German mark, the
average yield differential was 28 basis points. Both yield differentials peaked
between end-1992 and mid-1993, ie shortly after the surge in currency
denominated borrowing.
The rapidly increasing government debt load lead to a need to establish a
functioning bond market. Two important measures, worked together with the joint
effort of the Treasury and the Bank of Finland, helped in reaching this goal.
First, in 1991 the Treasury issued the first benchmark bonds. The aim of
granting a bond the benchmark status is to make potential investors aware of its
higher liquidity and at the same time stimulate interest in the bond market. The
Treasury decides on the benchmark status after consulting with the primary
dealers. Such status is granted after a bond’s outstanding stock and trading
volume have reached adequate levels.
                                                
1 Except for 1999, all domestic financing was initially Finnish markka denominated. We have
converted markkas into euros by using the fixed 1 EUR = 5.94573 FIM exchange rate.9
Figure 1. Change in Finnish Government’s domestic and































































































Second, as of August 1992, a primary dealer system was established. The
participants in this system, the primary dealers, have the privilege, but also the
obligation, to bid in Treasury bond auctions. Moreover, they agree to maintain a
secondary market in all market conditions by posting indicative bid and ask
quotes via public information channels. The evolution of the primary dealer
system and its links to the gross revenues of the dealers are sketched below. For
more detailed description of the primary dealer system, see Niskanen (1996).
All five initial primary dealers were major Finnish banks. At the time of
joining the system, these banks already had a long common history that had
materialized eg in developing an advanced interbank payment transfer system. As
will be shown later, the primary dealers earned significant revenues in the early
years the system was in place. This attracted several new market participants both
from Finland and from abroad. The first newcomer was the Finnish securities
house Evli which was admitted to the system in May 1993. Evli was followed by
the Danish Unibank, which joined the system in October 1993, and by the Finnish
Branch of Svenska Handelsbanken, which became a primary dealer in August
1994. The next landmark event after the entry of Evli occurred in September
1994, when Goldman Sachs International, operating from London, joined the
system. In 1994–1995 one more domestic securities house and one foreign bank
became primary dealers and two original dealers, one failed bank and one merged
bank, left the system. After one more foreign bank entered the system in early
1997, all ten participants remained in the system for about two years. As will be10
seen later, this was also a period when the gross revenues per dealer were much
lower than before. The number of primary dealers reduced to nine in January 1999
when Goldman Sachs left the system. In June-October 1999 one foreign primary
dealer entered and another left the system.
3D a t a
The data used is in this study are collected from several sources. The data on
benchmark bond auctions and conversions are from the Finnish Treasury and
cover the period January 1, 1991 – August 31, 1999. The secondary market data,
and the time series of the stock of domestic and foreign debt, are from the Bank of
Finland. Since the inception of the primary dealer system in the beginning of
August 1992, the Bank of Finland has required all primary dealers to supply data
on all of their trades on a daily basis. This allows the Bank of Finland to compile a
time series of the following variables for each bond and for each day: 1) inter-
dealer volume; 2) volume of purchases from customers; 3) volume of sales to
customers; 4) average inter-dealer yield; 5) average yield for purchases from
customers; 6) average yield for sales to customers; and 7) average bid rate at 1
P.M. These data have been posted daily on a Reuters screen.
The average yields for the actual transactions are calculated in the following
way. First, the Bank of Finland computes the equally weighted average of each
primary dealer’s transaction yields. Second, it computes the equally weighted
average of the primary dealers’ average yields. This procedure is repeated for each
combination of bond series and trade category (ie inter-dealer, customer purchase,
and customer sale). The average bid rate is the equally weighted average of the
primary dealers’ bid yields. Naturally, these are computed separately for each
bond series.
The secondary market data set ends at the same time as the auction data,
August 31, 1999. The auction and secondary market data are cross-checked with
the data obtained from the largest primary dealer, Nordea.
4 Empirical results
The Finnish Treasury uses four mechanisms to sell Treasury bonds. The time
series distribution and descriptive statistics relating to their relative size can be
seen in Table 1. The number of regular auctions is displayed in the second
column. The total number of auctions is 232, which are approximately evenly
distributed over time. The average bid/auction ratio of the regular auctions is11
1.765 which is considerably lower than in the U.S. (Sundaresan (1994)). The next
column to the right shows the number of occasions when the Treasury has sold
additional securities the next day. The total is 48. In those cases, primary dealers
that are awarded in the auction get the right to purchase additional securities of up
to 30% of the auction awards at a price that is equal to or higher than the auction
price. Bids for additional securities must be submitted by 4 P.M. the next day.
The next column shows the number of occasions when the Treasury retained
securities for lending purposes. The primary dealers can borrow these securities if
they have problems with meeting the physical delivery. Finally, the rightmost
column shows the number of conversion auctions. When old bonds mature, the
Treasury offers to redeem the old bonds for cash or to exchange the old bonds for
new securities. The exchange is carried out through auction.
Table 1. Distributions of Finnish Treasury bond auction
1991–1999
Table 1 reports the number of regular auctions, when additional securities are sold through a non-
competitive procedure the next day, when securities are retained for lending purposes, and when
maturing bonds are converted to new bonds. Bid volume is the face value of bids tendered, and
auction volume is the face value of the realized auction size. Both volumes are expressed in
millions of euros. The volume numbers for the conversion auctions are based on six of the fifteen
observations with complete data. The bid and auction volume numbers exclude one regular auction










1991 8 0 0 0
1992 35 3 0 0
1993 35 11 0 0
1994 31 8 0 1
1995 33 11 6 2
1996 37 11 1 2
1997 26 1 1 0
1998 22 3 2 3
1999 5 0 1 7
Totals 232 48 11 15
Bid volume, mill. EUR:
Mean 317 55 n.a. 587
Median 207 50 n.a. 362
Auction volume, mill. EUR:
Mean 182 40 108 551
Median 149 32 84 291
Bid volume / auction volume:
Mean 1.765 2.556 n.a. 1.106
Median 1.473 1.000 n.a. 1.04912
In Panel A of Table 2 we report the number of regular auctions by year and bond
maturity year. By observing the columns we can see that auctions for any given
maturity tend to be spread over several years. For instance, the Treasury issued
bonds maturing in 1999 every year between 1992 and 1996 in a total of 41
auctions. In a typical year, the Treasury issues bonds representing five different
maturities. Panel B shows the distribution of regular bond auctions by month. The
bond auctions are relatively evenly distributed across the year except that the
summer (August and particularly July) and the end of the year (November and
particularly December) are somewhat underrepresented.
Table 2. Number of regular Treasury bond auctions by
maturity year and by month
Panel A: Number of regular auctions by year and bond maturity year
Bond maturity year
Year 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 Total
1991 8 8
1992 3 6 13 13 35
1993 2 7 9 10 7 35
1994 10 1 9 5 6 31
1995 3 2 6 10 11 1 33
1996 4 8 9 9 7 37
1997 7 6 6 3 4 26
1 9 9 8 81 13261 2 2
1999 3 2 5
Totals 11 15 16 41 8 26 28 3 40 18 5 8 13 232
Panel B: Number of regular auctions by month














In Table 3, we compare the quoted spread with the realized spread, which we
measure as the average daily transaction yield for customers minus that for sales
to customers. We can see in the middle left section that the average realized
spread equals 1.14 basis points (bps) compared to the average quoted spread 3.83
bps. Below, we can see that the realized spread increases with the quoted spread
but the magnitude is substantially smaller.13
Table 3. Yield spreads and markups
Table 3 shows the equally weighted average and median bid and ask quotes at 1 P.M., and the
average transaction yield for purchases from customers (buy) and sales to customers (sell). The
spreads and markups are computed from all Finnish government benchmark bonds from the period
August 1, 1992 – August 31, 1999. The division of the sample to four quoted spreads is based on















Unconditional mean and median spread:
Mean 0.0383 0.0114 0.0108 0.0279 0.0231
Median 0.0300 0.0100 0.0100 0.0300 0.0200
Mean spread by size of quoted spread:
2 basis points 0.0200 0.0059 0.0097 0.0102 0.0165
3 basis points 0.0300 0.0090 0.0083 0.0216 0.0184
5 basis points 0.0500 0.0177 0.0134 0.0366 0.0317
10 basis points 0.1000 0.0198 0.0183 0.0817 0.0387
The location of transaction yields relative to the quotes can be seen in the right
middle section of Table 3. On average, the bid quote exceeds the purchase yield
by 1.08 bps, while the ask quote is located 2.79 bps below the purchase yield. The
asymmetry between these numbers suggests that transaction yields are biased
against the bid quote. This suggests that market participants depart from posted
bid quote and trade below. Accordingly, and consistent with Keloharju et al
(2002), we define the difference between the bid quote and the yield for sales to
customers as the dealer’s markup. The sales yield is chosen because, as we will
demonstrate later, dealers purchase in the auction to sell to customers in the
secondary market. The average markup can be seen to the right in Table 3 and
equals 2.31 bps. In order to construct secondary market prices for the purpose of
estimating underpricing, we take the auction time bid quote and substract the
average markup from the right column. Since the markup varies systematically
with the quoted spread, we vary the markup accordingly.
Table 4 reports the difference between the net proceeds from the Treasury
bond auctions and their value in the aftermarket at the time of the auction, ie “the
amount left on the table”, by year and bond maturity. The amount left on the table
consists of three components: a sales commission (0.03% of the nominal auction
size
2) and a redemption fee, both of which are paid directly to the primary dealers,
and underpricing, ie the difference between the aftermarket price and stop-out
price.
                                                
2 The magnitude of sales commission represents the sales commission as of 2002. We do not have
reliable evidence of whether or how the sales commission has changed over time, so we assume a
constant sales commission of 0.03% throughout the sample period.14
Table 4. Amount left on the table in regular Treasury bond
auctions by year and bond maturity
Table 4 reports the difference between the net proceeds from the Treasury bond auctions and their
value in the aftermarket at the time of the auction, ie “the amount left on the table”, by year and
bond maturity. The amount left on the table is split into two parts: the sum of a sales commission
(0.03% of nominal auction size) and redemption fee, paid directly to the primary dealers, and
underpricing, ie the difference between the aftermarket price and stop-out price. When there is no
information on redemption fees, we use the average redemption fee of 0.283%. There is no
redemption fee since April 1996. The yield used for computing the aftermarket price is the average
bid of all primary dealers minus the markup, ie the time-varying average effective spread between
the average bid rate and the average rate for actual sales to customers (bid-sell, from Table 3).
When there is no aftermarket price (ie no bid rate) on the auction day, we compute the aftermarket
price by adding the average underpricing of 0.041% to the stop-out price. The sample includes all
232 regular Treasury bond auctions from 1991–1999 except for one auction in November 1999.
Primary dealer revenues from additional auctions and conversions, for which we have incomplete
data, are not considered.
Panel A: Distribution of the money left on the table by bond maturity




1995 0.53 1.76 2.29
1996 0.21 12.13 12.34
1997 –0.78 7.04 6.25
1999 0.61 15.11 15.72
2000 0.80 0.83 1.64
2001 –0.45 9.20 8.75
2002 0.41 4.85 5.26
2003 0.17 0.23 0.40
2004 4.83 17.13 21.96
2006 4.58 1.63 6.21
2008 1.81 0.59 2.41
2009 3.10 0.79 3.89
2010 0.60 1.35 1.96
Totals 16.43 72.65 89.08

















1991 0.36 1.32 1.68 n.a. n.a.
1992 –0.29 5.38 5.09 5.00 1.02
1993 1.30 15.58 16.88 5.92 2.85
1994 2.91 14.13 17.04 7.96 2.14
1995 1.25 25.09 26.34 9.54 2.76
1996 3.79 6.13 9.92 9.00 1.10
1997 3.10 2.55 5.65 9.96 0.57
1998 4.33 2.12 6.45 10.00 0.65
1999 –0.33 0.35 0.02 9.13 0.00
Totals 16.43 72.65 89.0815
We can see from the last row from Panel A that about 82% of the money left on
the table, EUR 73 million, is due to redemption fees and sales commissions. The
redemption fee, a fee for manually handling physical bond certificates, is on
average 0.283% of gross proceeds from the auction and varies between 0.163%
and 0.365%. It was abolished in April 1996.
3 This explains why the redemption
fee, and the total amount of money left on the table, is largest in the earlier sample
years – when the Treasury’s bargaining position with respect to the primary
dealers was probably the weakest. We do not have data for the redemption fees
for additional auctions or conversions. However, assuming that the primary
dealers charged the same percentage redemption fee from additional auctions as
from ordinary auctions held at the same time, the combined additional auction
redemption fee is EUR 4.87 million from the entire sample period. Given that
most conversions occurred towards the end of the sample period when redemption
fees no longer existed, the redemption fee revenue from conversions is probably
much smaller.
Underpricing, on average 0.041% of gross proceeds, accounts for the
remaining 20%, or EUR 16.4 million, of the money left on the table. Except for
two bond series, all bond series were on average underpriced. The results
concerning underpricing are robust to the method for estimating the secondary
market price. For instance, using a fixed markup during the entire sample period
instead of a time-varying markup would change the total amount of underpricing
by less than 10%, from EUR 16.43 million to EUR 17.82 million.
Trading revenues of primary dealers derive from three sources: the bid-ask
spread, the appreciation of inventory accumulated through trading, and the coupon
receipts of bonds in that inventory. Given the absence of inventory data,
4 we shall
focus on the bid-ask spread, ie the trading margin.
Table 5 investigates the distribution of trading volume and trading margin by
year and bond maturity. The trading margin is the product of customer trading
volume and effective half-spread, and it is computed separately for each day and
bond series. Customer trading volume is the sum of primary dealers’ buy and sell
volume with their customers, and the effective half spread is one half of the
difference between average price for sales to customers and purchases from
customers.
                                                
3 The information on redemption fees (“lunastuspalkkio”) is collected from the Treasury’s original
bond auction sheets. As of April 1996, the auction sheets no longer include remarks of redemption
fees.
4 The availability of data on auction volumes and customer trading volume makes it in principle
possible to estimate the aggregate size of primary dealer inventory. However, given that not all
auctioned bonds are sold to the customers in the secondary market, and that there appears to be
substantial variation in the ratio of net customer sales to auction proceeds, it is very difficult to
estimate aggregate inventories in a reliable way.16
Table 5. Trading volume and trading margin by bond
maturity and year
Table 5 shows the customer trading volume and trading margin for all Finnish government
benchmark bonds for the period August 1, 1992 – August 31, 1999. The trading margin is the
product of customer trading volume and effective half-spread, and it is computed separately for
each day and bond series. Customer trading volume is the sum of primary dealers’ buy and sell
volume with their customers, and the effective half spread is one half of the difference between
average price for sales to customers and purchases from customers. Panel A reports daily average
and median trading margins and volumes, pooled over all trading days with a given bond maturity,
by maturity. Panel B reports average and median trading margins and volumes by auction year.
Panel A: Volume and trading margin by bond maturity















# of pos. tr.
margin days /






1995 11 7 5,032 0.0026 0.0005 1.21 466 81.82% 0.024%
1996 60 46 19,500 0.0057 0.0036 1.87 326 88.81% 0.010%
1997 34 22 31,174 0.0054 0.0027 4.91 915 84.22% 0.016%
1999 67 44 93,111 0.0088 0.0056 12.18 1390 81.34% 0.013%
2000 50 22 12,621 0.0026 0.0001 0.66 252 82.74% 0.005%
2001 65 49 65,223 0.0079 0.0013 7.91 999 76.66% 0.012%
2002 12 4 20,118 0.0063 0.0003 10.15 1619 87.19% 0.050%
2003 32 17 4,414 0.0049 0.0011 0.69 140 83.84% 0.016%
2004 70 51 109,652 0.0184 0.0089 28.90 1569 79.59% 0.026%
2006 72 52 55,661 0.0152 0.0028 11.71 773 76.30% 0.021%
2008 50 34 22,598 0.0102 0.0012 4.59 449 76.62% 0.020%
2009 68 52 18,186 0.0086 0.0000 2.31 269 63.49% 0.013%
2010 27 12 7,462 0.0034 0.0000 0.93 279 73.60% 0.013%
Totals 49 29 464,752 0.0093 0.0020 88.03 9446 80.82% 0.019%
Panel B: Volume and trading margin by year















# of pos. tr.
margin days /






1992 13 8 4,294 0.0051 0.0004 1.74 341 77.43% 0.041%
1993 31 21 35,847 0.0118 0.0043 13.57 1150 86.75% 0.038%
1994 44 28 55,091 0.0124 0.0050 15.73 1265 83.27% 0.029%
1995 54 38 68,276 0.0102 0.0041 12.75 1255 86.82% 0.019%
1996 63 47 78,190 0.0146 0.0039 18.18 1244 85.13% 0.023%
1997 73 45 93,521 0.0087 0.0000 11.20 1280 75.72% 0.012%
1998 52 32 83,984 0.0049 0.0000 7.91 1624 72.32% 0.009%
1999 35 20 45,550 0.0054 0.0003 6.95 1287 75.45% 0.015%
Totals 49 29 464,752 0.0093 0.0020 88.03 9446 80.82% 0.019%17
From the last row of Panel A in Table 5 we can see that the daily mean customer
volume is EUR 49 million per bond and the median EUR 29 million. The
combined customer trading volume of all bonds between August 1, 1992 and
August 31, 1999 was EUR 465 billion, two times as much as the combined inter-
dealer trading volume (EUR 228 billion). The trading volume increased
monotonically from 1992 to 1997 and then decreased during the last two sample
years. The average trading margin, reported in the bottom row in the rightmost
column, is 0.019%. The highest margin, 0.050%, is recorded for the 2002 series,
which has the lowest median trading volume in the sample.
5 The combined
trading margin over the sample period is EUR 88 million, ie about 15% higher
than the combined money left on the table in the primary market between 1991–
1999. Based on the evidence in Hansch and Saporta (1999), the total trading
revenues may be substantially higher. They show that market makers in the gilt
market incur positive positioning revenues accounting roughly 40% of their total
trading revenues.
6 If positioning revenues of this magnitude were to apply in the
Finnish Treasury bond market, this would translate to a combined positioning
revenue of about EUR 60 million throughout the sample period.
Table 6 computes the sum of redemption fees and sales commissions
(reported in Table 4) and trading margins (reported in Table 5) on an annual and
per dealer basis. This results in an estimate of the gross revenues of the primary
dealers, reported in the third column from right. As we can observe by looking at
this column, and the rightmost column that reports gross revenues per primary
dealer, the largest gross revenues occurred in 1993–1996. In 1997–1999 the gross
revenues were notably smaller due to the shrinkage in trading margins and the end
to the redemption fees.
                                                
5 Technically this bond differs from the other bonds in that it is backed by a pool of mortgages
rather than by the Finnish Government.
6 Market makers earn trading revenues from the bid-ask spread, whereas positioning revenues
incur from positions when asset prices change.18
Table 6. Sales commission, redemption fee, and trading
margin by year and per dealer
Table 6 shows the distribution of trading margins, sales commissions, and redemption fees by year.
The data on redemption fees and sales commissions comes from Table 4 and the data on trading
margins from Table 5. The trading margins are computed from all Finnish government benchmark
bonds from the period August 1, 1992 – August 31, 1999. The trading margins in 1992 and 1999
















1992 4.18 5.38 9.55 5.00 1.91
1993 13.57 15.58 29.15 5.92 4.93
1994 15.73 14.13 29.86 7.96 3.75
1995 12.75 25.09 37.84 9.54 3.97
1996 18.18 6.13 24.31 9.00 2.70
1997 11.20 2.55 13.75 9.96 1.38
1998 7.91 2.12 10.03 10.00 1.00
1999 10.43 0.35 10.78 9.13 1.18
Table 7 shows the development of trading volume during a nine-day window
around the auctions. Panel A reports the ratio of inter-dealer trading volume on
each of the nine days to the sum of inter-dealer volume on all nine days. We
compute these ratios both for the auctioned bonds and for benchmark bonds that
are not auctioned. When more than one bond is auctioned on a given day, or there
are several benchmark bonds, the equally weighted average of the bonds is used
as the unit of observation.
The top row in Panel A, Table 7 suggests that the inter-dealer trading volume
is highest on the auction day for the auctioned bonds. However, as shown in the
second row from top, there is also a similar increase in the volume of benchmark
bonds. Overall, the volume for the auctioned bond tends to be below that of the
benchmark bond, and a non-parametric test finds a significant difference between
the auctioned and benchmark bond volumes on four of the nine days in the event
window.
Panel B of Table 7 reports trading volume of primary dealers’ purchases from
their customers. Like for inter-dealer volume, there is a notable peak in purchase
volume for the auctioned bonds on the auction day. For example, the fraction of
purchase volume ranges from 9.35% to 11.00% on the four days immediately
preceding the auction, but jumps to 18.20% on the auction day. There is also an
increase in the trading volume of benchmark bonds, but this increase is much less
remarkable. On the auction day the volume difference between the auctioned
bonds and benchmark bonds is 4.14% of the aggregate volume during the nine-
day window, a highly significant result. This suggests that there is a significant
abnormal increase in purchases from customers on the auction day, perhaps an19
outcome of the risk arbitrage opportunity created by the difference between the
secondary market price and the expected auction price.
Table 7. Trading volume around the auction day
Table 7 shows the development of trading volume during a nine-day window around regular
auctions for all Finnish government benchmark bonds for the period August 1, 1992 – August 31,
1999. Panel A reports trading volume among primary dealers and Panels B and C trading volume
of primary dealers’ purchase and sales transactions with their customers, respectively. The row
“Auction average” refers to the trading volume for the auctioned bonds and the row “Benchmark
average” for the trading volume for the remaining bonds at the same time. When more than one
bond is auctioned on a given day, or there are several benchmark bonds, the equally weighted
average of the bonds is used as the unit of observation.
Panel A: Primary dealer trades
Volume on day t / Volume on days t–4 thru t+4
Day t = Auction days plus
– 4 – 3 – 2 – 1 01234
Auction average 12.16% 10.82% 11.28% 12.33% 15.08% 12.09% 10.76% 13.04% 14.38%
Benchmark average 14.04% 12.24% 13.29% 12.65% 15.09% 13.74% 11.59% 13.00% 15.10%
Average difference –1.88% –1.42% –2.01% –0.31% –0.01% –1.65% –0.82% 0.04% –0.72%
t-value –1.96 –1.83 –2.50 –0.41 –0.01 –1.94 –1.18 0.05 –0.85
Fraction positive 40.68% 43.59% 33.07% 42.86% 45.16% 37.69% 39.50% 45.60% 43.75%
z-value –2.03 –1.39 –3.82 –1.60 –1.08 –2.81 –2.29 –0.98 –1.41
N 118 117 127 126 124 130 119 125 128
Panel B: Purchases from customers
Volume on day t / Volume on days t–4 thru t+4
Day t = Auction days plus
– 4 – 3 – 2 – 1 01234
Auction average 10.10% 9.35% 10.39% 11.00% 18.20% 11.54% 10.55% 11.62% 12.47%
Benchmark average 12.03% 10.74% 13.12% 12.54% 14.05% 13.21% 11.24% 13.19% 14.39%
Average difference –1.93% –1.39% –2.73% –1.55% 4.14% –1.68% –0.69% –1.58% –1.91%
t-value –2.56 –1.87 –3.84 –1.85 3.74 –2.25 –0.89 –2.18 –2.34
Fraction positive 43.18% 42.86% 35.16% 40.74% 63.50% 39.69% 45.04% 43.61% 40.58%
z-value –1.57 –1.60 –3.36 –2.15 3.16 –2.36 –1.14 –1.47 –2.21
N 132 126 128 135 137 131 131 133 138
Panel C: Sales to customers
Volume on day t / Volume on days t–4 thru t+4
Day t = Auction days plus
– 4 – 3 – 2 – 1 01234
Auction average 7.70% 6.47% 7.64% 8.11% 37.66% 8.66% 7.17% 8.78% 9.23%
Benchmark average 12.94% 10.81% 12.14% 12.06% 13.23% 12.04% 11.27% 12.52% 14.39%
Average difference –5.24% –4.34% –4.50% –3.95% 24.43% –3.37% –4.10% –3.74% –5.16%
t-value –6.31 –8.01 –6.67 –5.68 19.63 –4.77 –6.76 –5.45 –7.16
Fraction positive 18.66% 20.90% 26.47% 26.62% 95.71% 34.78% 31.11% 26.47% 25.55%
z-value –7.26 –6.74 –5.49 –5.51 10.82 –3.58 –4.39 –5.49 –5.72
N 134 134 136 139 140 138 135 136 137
Panel C of Table 7 reports trading volume of primary dealers’ sell transactions
with their customers. Like in Panels A and B, the peak volume for both the
auctioned and benchmark bonds is achieved on the auction day. The results differ
from the earlier panels mostly in the magnitude of the increase in sales volume of
the auctioned bond on the auction day. The fraction of sales volume ranges from
6.47% to 8.11% on the four days immediately preceding the auction, and between
7.17% to 9.23% on the four days immediately following the auction, but is as20
much as 37.66% on the auction day. The average auction day difference between
the auctioned bond and the benchmark bond is 24.43%, a highly significant result.
Table 8 shows the development of net sales volume scaled by auction size
during a nine-day window around the auction. Net sales volume is defined as the
difference between sales volume to customers and purchase volume from
customers. Consistent with Table 7, there is a peak in net sales on the auction day.
This constitutes on average 52% of auction size. This is consistent with the notion
that the primary dealers purchase the bonds on behalf of their customers and place
them in client portfolios immediately after the auction. The top two rows of the
table also show that net sales are on average positive on all event days. In other
words, the primary dealers empty their portfolios before the auction and remain
net sellers of the auctioned bonds also after the auction. The sum of average
(median) ratios between net sales and auction size over the nine event days,
tabulated in the rightmost column, is 66% (65%). Although not reported here
formally, the ratio of net sales to auction size was somewhat higher in 1992–1994
than in 1995–1999. In the earlier period the sum of average net sales ratios over
the nine event days was 74% whereas in the latter period it was 59%.
Table 8. Net sales volume of Treasury bonds around the
auction day
Table 8 shows the development of net sales volume scaled by auction size during a nine-day
window around regular auctions for all Finnish government benchmark bonds for the period August
1, 1992 – August 31, 1999. Net sales is the difference between sales volume to customers and
purchase volume from customers. When more than one bond is auctioned on a given day, the
equally weighted average of the bonds is used as the unit of observation.
Net sales on day t / Auction size
Day t = Auction day plus




Average 3.84% 0.44% 1.38% 1.00% 51.76% 4.24% 2.45% 0.45% 0.41% 65.98%
Median 0.00% 0.71% 1.40% 1.15% 55.22% 2.47% 1.70% 0.94% 1.30% 64.90%
t-value 1.49 0.39 0.82 0.74 17.87 1.86 1.70 0.30 0.26
Fraction
positive 42.66% 56.64% 59.44% 53.85% 89.51% 59.44% 54.55% 54.55% 56.64%
z-value –1.76 1.59 2.26 0.92 9.45 2.26 1.09 1.09 1.59
N 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143
Table 9 shows the development of secondary market prices during an eight-day
window around the auctions. A price change for an auctioned bond is computed
relative to its price four days before the auction. The reported price changes are
price changes for the auctioned bonds less the average price changes for the same
period for the bonds not auctioned. Panel A reports the price changes for the full
sample period, Panel B for subperiod 1992–1994, and Panel C for subperiod
1995–1999. All prices are actual transactions prices from transactions conducted
among primary dealers. When more than one bond is auctioned on a given day, or
there are several benchmark bonds, the equally weighted average of the bonds is
used as the unit of observation.21
Table 9. Price changes of Treasury bonds around the
auction day
Table 9 shows the development of secondary market prices during an eight-day window around
regular auctions for all Finnish government benchmark bonds for the period August 1, 1992 –
August 31, 1999. A price change for an auctioned bond is computed relative to its price four days
before the auction. The reported price changes are price changes for the auctioned bonds less the
average price changes from the same period for the bonds not auctioned. Panel A reports the price
changes for the full sample period, Panel B for subperiod 1992–1994, and Panel C for subperiod
1995–1999. All prices are actual transactions prices from transactions conducted among primary
dealers. When more than one bond is auctioned on a given day, or there are several benchmark
bonds, the equally weighted average of the bonds is used as the unit of observation.
Panel A: Full sample period 1992–1999
Price change for auctioned bond – Price change for benchmark bond relative
to auction day –4
Auction day plus
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4
Auction –0.04% –0.05% –0.07% –0.15% –0.19% –0.14% –0.07% –0.10%
Median –0.01% –0.03% –0.05% –0.06% –0.08% –0.11% –0.01% –0.03%
t-value –1.11 –1.66 –2.41 –3.16 –3.47 –2.38 –1.22 –1.51
Fraction positive 49.53% 43.52% 40.37% 39.45% 39.25% 37.62% 49.06% 46.36%
z-value –0.10 –1.35 –2.01 –2.20 –2.22 –2.49 –0.19 –0.76
N 107 108 109 109 107 101 106 110
Panel B: 1992–1994
Price change for auctioned bond – Price change for benchmark bond relative
to auction day –4
Auction day plus
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4
Auction –0.04% –0.07% –0.12% –0.31% –0.42% –0.33% –0.26% –0.39%
Median –0.02% –0.08% –0.08% –0.21% –0.30% –0.20% –0.13% –0.17%
t-value –0.57 –1.21 –2.41 –3.27 –3.58 –2.92 –2.37 –3.01
Fraction positive 45.45% 32.56% 32.56% 22.73% 26.83% 28.57% 35.71% 31.11%
z-value –0.60 –2.29 –2.29 –3.62 –2.97 –2.78 –1.85 –2.53
N 4 44 34 34 44 14 24 24 5
Panel C: 1995–1999
Price change for auctioned bond – Price change for benchmark bond relative
to auction day –4
Auction day plus
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4
Auction –0.03% –0.03% –0.04% –0.04% –0.05% 0.00% 0.06% 0.10%
Median 0.02% 0.00% –0.02% 0.01% –0.03% –0.05% 0.03% 0.09%
t-value –1.30 –1.13 –1.04 –0.91 –1.10 –0.07 1.21 1.87
Fraction positive 52.38% 50.77% 45.45% 50.77% 46.97% 44.07% 57.81% 56.92%
z-value 0.38 0.12 –0.74 0.12 –0.49 –0.91 1.25 1.12
N 6 36 56 66 56 65 96 46 5
Panel A indicates that the benchmark-adjusted prices for the auctioned bonds drift
downward after event day –4. The average (median) adjusted price change is
–0.15% (–0.06%) on event day 0 and –0.19% (–0.08%) on event day +1. From
day 2, the benchmark-adjusted bond prices start to pick up, but the adjusted prices
never reach the level they started from. The average adjusted price change relative
to event day –4 is –0.10% (–0.03%) on event day +4. All price changes relative to22
event day –4 between event days –1 and +2 are significantly negative at the 5%
level.
Panel B reports the development of benchmark-adjusted prices for bonds
auctioned in 1992–1994. The price pattern up to the auction is similar as in Panel
A but more distinct. The average (median) adjusted price change relative to event
day –4 is –0.31% (–0.21%) on event day 0 and –0.42% (–0.30%) on event day +1.
Despite of a relatively small number of observations, these price changes are
highly significant. However, perhaps due to the relatively small number of
observations, there is no clear evidence that the price of the auctioned bond would
pick up after the auction: the mean price drifts downward from day 0 to day +4,
whereas the median price and the fraction of positive differences drift upward.
Panel C, which reports the results for 1995–1999, finds a small price decline from
day –4 up to the auction day and a somewhat larger price increase during the next
four trading days. These results, however, are not statistically significant at the
5% level.
What accounts for the abnormal price development for auctioned bonds
around the auctions? There are three potential explanations.
First, a bond auction causes a supply shock that the market may not be willing
to absorb without a discount. Scholes (1972), Kraus and Stoll (1972), Keim and
Madhavan (1996) and others show that supply shocks due to block trades
temporarily depress stock prices and that the price adjusts already before the
actual transaction as information leaks that a block is being shopped around. Kyle
(1989) and Wang and Zender (2002) point out that dealers require a risk premium
to bear the price risk between the auction and the time they sell the securities to
final investors (although Keloharju et al (2002) find that the models behind this
risk sharing argument are not fully consistent with the pattern of bidding behavior
and underpricing in Finnish Treasury bond auctions). As shown in Table 8, the
supply shock lasts for several days and it also takes several days for the price to
recover. Although not reported here formally, there is evidence that bond auctions
with the highest cumulative net sales of bonds during the event window are
associated with the highest price declines: the correlation between the cumulative
benchmark-adjusted price change on the auction day and the corresponding
cumulated ratio of primary dealer net sales to auction size is .28 (t-value 3.03). As
shown in Panel B of Table 9, evidence of price pressure is strongest in the
beginning of the sample period when the secondary market trading volume was
relatively modest and the effect of a supply shock was probably the strongest.
Second, there might be excess private information at the time of the auction,
giving raise to an adverse selection problem. The microstructure literature (see,
eg, Bagehot (1971), Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and
Glosten and Harris (1988)) suggests that the presence of excessive private
information tends to be associated with decreased volumes and wider spreads,
thereby inducing lower prices. However, as shown in Table 7, trading volume23
tends to be abnormally high on the auction day, not vice versa. Moreover,
although not reported here formally, actual spreads for auctioned securities tend to
be particularly low on the auction day when compared with the spreads during the
surrounding days. Therefore, the adverse selection argument cannot explain the
pattern of abnormal returns.
Third, primary dealers may have had an incentive to influence the aftermarket
price before the auction. This may have been easier in the early sample period
when there were fewer market participants and the trading volume was lower.
Keloharju et al. (2002) show that the Treasury has set the supply of the bonds in
such a way that the average spread between the auction stop-out yield and the
secondary market yield is more or less constant over time. Therefore, a decrease
in secondary market price before the auction could induce the Treasury to sell the
bonds cheaper. As explained earlier, in the beginning of the sample period the
financing needs of the Treasury may have overridden its concerns for price, and
may have made it reluctant to combat the adverse price development by cutting
supply.
Although not reported formally, we also investigate the development of other
benchmark-adjusted secondary market price series. Bid prices and prices from
customer purchase and sales transactions yield similar although somewhat less
distinct results. For example, the average benchmark-adjusted bid price change
from event day –4 to the auction day for the entire sample period is –0.11%. The
corresponding numbers for customer purchase and sales prices are –0.06% and
–0.10%, respectively. Except for customer purchases, the price changes are
significantly negative at the 5% level.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we document a number of basic descriptive statistics from the
Finnish Treasury bond market from 1991–1999. Moreover, we assess the gross
revenues of the primary dealers for Treasury bonds by investigating the
magnitude of redemption fees and sales commissions in the primary market and
trading margins in the secondary market. Finally, we analyze the development of
the price of the auctioned bonds, relative to other benchmark bonds, around the
time of the auction. We report that the price of the auctioned bond series tends to
drop before the auction and increase after the auction. This pattern is strongest in
1992-94 when the funding needs of the Treasury were very large and the
secondary market trading volume of Treasury bonds was relatively modest. The
magnitude of the price change is inversely related to the magnitude of primary
dealers’ net sales of bonds to their customers.24
We have chosen to concentrate on the Treasury bond market, which is the
largest component of the Finnish debt market. A more comprehensive account of
the revenues of the primary dealers would analyze the Treasury bill market and
the market for bond futures. This is left for future work.25
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